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This paper examines the effect of fall 2020 school reopenings in Texas on county-level COVID-
19 cases and fatalities. Previous evidence suggests that schools can be reopened safely if 
community spread is low and public health guidelines are followed. However, in Texas, 
reopenings often occurred alongside high community spread and at near capacity, likely making it 
difficult to meet social distancing recommendations. Using event-study models and hand-collected 
instruction modality and start dates for all school districts, we find robust evidence that reopening 
Texas schools gradually but substantially accelerated the community spread of COVID-19. Results 
from our preferred specification imply that school reopenings led to at least 43,000 additional 
COVID-19 cases and 800 additional fatalities within the first two months. We then use SafeGraph 
mobility data to provide evidence that spillovers to adults’ behaviors contributed to these large 
effects. Median time spent outside the home on a typical weekday increased substantially in 
neighborhoods with large numbers of school-age children, suggesting a return to in-person work 
or increased outside-of-home leisure activities among parents.  
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 The COVID-19 pandemic has led to gut-wrenching decisions about whether and when to 
open schools for in-person instruction. Ideally, these decisions would be made from an evidence-
based cost-benefit analysis. However, initially there was very little evidence to make these 
decisions, and only recently has more information become available. On the benefit side, recent 
research suggests that remote learning leads to significant learning loss, especially among 
disadvantaged populations (Kuhfeld et al., 2020; Kuhfield and Tarasawa, 2020; Maldonado and 
Witte, 2020). Remote learning also could lead to delayed social and emotional development and 
reduced detection of child abuse as teachers are often at the front lines of detection (Schmidt and 
Natanson, 2020). In addition, remote learning could lead families to make difficult decisions 
between working and staying home with young children, which could dampen the speed of the 
economic recovery (Green et al, 2020; Council of Economic Advisers, 2020). Together, this 
suggests that opening schools could improve student learning and social and emotional 
development while minimizing the possibility of child abuse. 
On the cost side, there are concerns of health risks for students, staff, and the larger 
community as the openings could further spread COVID-19. These concerns have been 
championed by teacher unions, which argue that schools should open only when they are safe 
(Hurt, Ball, and Wedell, 2020). However, a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
report examining 17 rural Wisconsin schools using contact tracing found minimal transmission 
both within and outside of the schools (Falk et al., 2021). Other investigations of known cases 
among students and staff – such as Doyle et al.’s (2021) study of Florida and Emily Oster’s K-12 
COVID-19 dashboard – tend to reach similar conclusions.1 Accordingly, the CDC recently 
 
1 Oster’s dashboard is available at https://covidschooldashboard.com/.  
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concluded that in-person instruction can be carried out safely as long as masks are worn, social 
distancing is maintained, community spread is low, and other community restrictions (e.g., on 
restaurants) remain in place (Honein et al., 2021). 
However, contact-tracing-based evidence alone is insufficient to fully understand the 
health implications of reopening schools. Contact tracing is widely known to be inadequate in the 
U.S. due to insufficient staff and resources to keep up with large numbers of new cases, as well as 
resistance to provide information among those contacted. For instance, a National Public Radio 
story found that 27 percent of cases and 43 percent of contacts lacked phone numbers in Delaware, 
only 44 percent of new cases were reached within 24 hours in New Jersey, and only 4.5 percent 
and 25 percent of cases could be traced to known contacts in Washington, D.C. and Delaware, 
respectively (Simmons-Duffin, 2020). Moreover, econometric evidence from Dave et al. (2020) 
linked more than 100,000 cases to the Sturgis Motorcycle Rally in South Dakota, compared to just 
328 identified by contact tracing. This illustrates the potential for contact tracing to substantially 
underestimate the total number of cases resulting from a particular event after several rounds of 
exponential spread. One missing link in the contact tracing chain prevents the attribution to the 
event of any people infected by the missing link, any people those people subsequently infected, 
and so on. 
On the other hand, the number of known cases resulting from in-school spread could 
overstate the net increase in the number of cases, as it does not account for the counterfactual 
activities students and staff would be engaging in if schools were closed. While some students and 
staff would stay at home and face little risk, others would go to day care facilities, parks, 
restaurants, virtual school pods at friends’ houses, or other places where adherence to mitigation 
measures could be lower than in schools (Courtemanche et al., 2020). 
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Additionally, focusing only on net changes in risk among those attending school misses a 
potentially important part of the story: spillover effects on the behaviors of parents or others in the 
community. Kids returning to in-person school may allow parents or other caregivers to return to 
in-person work or outside-the-home activities, leading to COVID-19 spread in the community 
even if there is minimal spread in the schools. Spillovers could even extend beyond families 
directly affected by the return to school, as school openings could signal to the community that it 
is safe to return to normal activities, again fueling spread (Glaeser et al., 2020). Alternatively, 
spillovers could reduce spread if people foresee danger from school reopenings and cut back on 
other activities. 
Econometric studies can provide answers to these debates by estimating reduced-form 
effects that encompass all mechanisms through which reopening schools influences the spread of 
COVID-19. Three concurrent working papers examine the effects of school openings in Germany 
(Isphording et al, 2021), Michigan and Washington (Goldhaber et al., 2021, hereinafter we refer 
to as CALDER study) and the U.S. as a whole (Harris et al., 2021, hereinafter we refer to as Tulane 
study). While the current versions of these studies find little evidence that reopening schools 
increases COVID-19 spread on average, the Tulane and CALDER studies find some evidence that 
this may not be the case in communities with high levels of preexisting transmission.  
The above discussion highlights a key distinction: the consensus that schools can open 
safely with low community spread and proper safeguards is not the same as saying that all schools 
are opening safely. To examine what can happen in a less idealized scenario, we focus on the state 
of Texas. All of the school districts in Texas reopened for in-person instruction at some point 
during the 2020 fall semester. Many did so when COVID-19 rates in the community were 
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relatively high, generally without staggered or hybrid strategies to limit the number of students 
attending at one time. 
We estimate the impact of school reopenings in Texas on COVID-19 spread using hand-
collected information on school districts’ instructional modality and start dates combined with 
weekly county-level data on confirmed COVID-19 cases and fatalities. Our baseline model is an 
event study that separately estimates effects for each week in a four-month bandwidth surrounding 
reopenings. This allows us to assess pre-treatment trends while also allowing impacts to emerge 
gradually due to incubation periods, testing delays, multiple rounds of subsequent spread, and the 
fact that COVID-19 deaths tend not to occur quickly. We find that school reopenings in Texas 
gradually but substantially increased the per capita numbers of new weekly COVID-19 cases and 
deaths. To illustrate, 95 percent confidence intervals from the baseline regression imply that school 
reopenings across Texas led to at least 43,000 additional COVID-19 cases and at least 800 
additional fatalities after two months. These magnitudes represent 12 percent and 17 percent, 
respectively, of the total numbers of cases and deaths in the state during that period. Results are 
qualitatively similar across a wide range of robustness checks, including those that address newly 
discovered issues with staggered-treatment-time two-way-fixed-effects research designs. Using 
similar event-study models and SafeGraph data (which tracks the movement of individuals aged 
16 and older by using cell phone data), we show that time spent outside the home by adults rose 
sharply in communities with the largest numbers of children after school reopenings. Some 
evidence also suggests increased mobility in communities with large numbers of seniors, 
consistent with signaling effects on those not directly affected by the reopenings. 
Overall, we find convincing evidence that opening schools led to community spread, and 
was likely facilitated by increased mobility, which could arise both directly in schools but also 
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indirectly through the behaviors of parents or other adults. Although the recent distribution of 
effective vaccines is changing the cost-benefit of the calculations policymakers are making, 
difficult decisions about schools will likely continue into the 2021-2022 academic year. Children 
under sixteen years old cannot yet be vaccinated, there are broad geographic pockets across the 
country with low adult vaccination rates, and the emerging variant B.1.1.7 infects children more 
easily than prior strains. 2,3  
II. Background 
School Reopenings in Texas 
On July 7, 2020, the Texas Education Agency (TEA) issued school reopening guidelines, 
which covered topics such as COVID-19 prevention, responses, mitigation, and information 
dissemination.4 These guidelines covered the wearing of masks, reporting of positive cases, and 
screening of staff, teachers, and students. Most importantly, it provided the following guidance for 
reopening schools: “during a period up to the first four weeks of school, which can be extended by 
an additional four weeks by vote of the school board, school systems may temporarily limit access 
to on-campus instruction.”  
These instructions were further clarified by a July 17, 2020 joint statement from Governor 
Greg Abbot, Lt. Governor Dan Patrick, Speaker Dennis Bonnen, Senate Education Chairman 
Larry Taylor, and House Education Chairman Dan Huberty. They stated that local school districts 
have the constitutional authority to decide when and how schools safely open and noted that local 









even later.”5 They also noted that local school boards can make these decisions “on advice and 
recommendations by local public health authorities but are not bound by those recommendations.” 
Importantly, the statement also clarified that not only could school districts start the first four 
weeks as a “back to school transition” with remote instruction, but school districts could extend 
their back-to-school transition an additional four weeks with a vote of the school board and a 
waiver from the state. After eight weeks, school districts could ask for an addition extension as the 
result of health concerns related to COVID-19 and the TEA will decide those requests on a case-
by-case basis. Finally, the guidance from TEA noted that school districts must provide the option 
for families of remote instruction, even if the school district provides in-person instruction. 
However, because of the challenges of the logistics of providing both in-person and remote 
instruction, school districts could restrict families to switching their choice of instructional 
modality only at the end of grading periods. 
With this policy context as background, Figure 1 displays the start date of opening schools 
for in-person instruction for school districts in the 2020-21 school year relative to the start date of 
opening schools in the 2019-20 school year.6 About two-thirds of school districts opened schools 
in 2020-21 within one week of the start date of 2019-20 in spite of the widely documented surge 
in COVID-19 cases in Texas in the summer of 2020. Moreover, less than two percent of school 
districts delayed the reopening by more than eight weeks, possibly because of the requirements 




6 In most districts, we were able to determine the 2019-20 start date.  However, in the cases where we were not able 
to identify the 2019-20 start date we either used the prior year start date (e.g., 2018-19) or the median 2019-20 start 
date within the county. 
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extent that state directives trumped local caseloads or politics in influencing reopening decisions, 
that would help to alleviate endogeneity concerns in our econometric analysis. 
Econometric Evidence on Schools and COVID-19 
As the pandemic began to unfold during the spring of 2020, very little was known about 
the likelihood of spread among young populations and whether schools could safely operate with 
in-person instruction. Three early studies that controlled for other accompanying restrictions like 
restaurant closures and shelter-in-place orders did not find evidence that school closings slowed 
the spread of COVID-19 (Courtemanche et al., 2020; Hsiang et al., 2020; Flaxman et al., 2020). 
However, a fourth study that did not control for these other restrictions did find evidence of a 
sizeable effect (Auger et al., 2020). These prior studies are of limited usefulness for reopening 
decisions as almost all the spring school closures in the United States occurred within one week 
of each other, leading to little identifying variation and generally imprecise estimates. While 
controlling for other types of restrictions is important for causal inference, it further strains the 
available identifying variation, perhaps explaining the null findings from studies that did so. 
Further, it is not clear that closings and openings should have symmetric effects. Much more was 
known about mitigation strategies in fall 2020 compared to spring, but community spread was also 
much greater in the fall. 
Only recently has econometric evidence on reopening schools begun to emerge. Isphording 
et al. (2020) leveraged variation in the timing of school start dates and found little evidence of 
effects on community spread in Germany.7 However, the relevance of this finding for a U.S. 
population with different attitudes toward COVID-19 and different mitigation policies, both inside 
 
7 This result is consistent with two descriptive studies of small sets of schools in France and Helsinki that also found 
little evidence of spread (Dub et al., 2020; Fontanet et al., 2020). 
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and outside of schools, is unclear. Tulane researchers used national insurance claims data and U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) hospitalization data along with national data on 
school reopenings to examine the impact of school reopenings on hospitalization (Harris et al., 
2021). Overall, they found no association between school reopenings and hospitalization. 
However, they noted that in areas with higher pre-opening COVID-19 hospitalization rates, the 
results are less conclusive with some evidence indicating that in these areas, school openings could 
lead to greater hospitalizations. Given that the data for the study was only collected through mid-
fall 2020—prior to much of the national surge of hospitalizations—the study’s findings do not 
necessarily extrapolate to later in the pandemic. Moreover, the sample period only allows for six 
weeks of post-treatment data, which may not be enough time for meaningful increases in 
hospitalizations to occur given incubation periods and the potential need for multiple rounds of 
spread outward from schools before reaching the vulnerable individuals who are most likely to 
require hospitalization. 
Another study, released by a research consortium named CALDER, examined monthly 
county level COVID-19 cases using school reopening information provided by Michigan and 
Washington’s departments of education (Goldhaber et al., 2021). The researchers noted that in 
Washington, only 10 percent of districts (almost entirely rural) and only 2 percent of the student 
population was attending either a school operating with hybrid or in-person instruction. In 
Michigan, the percentages were higher, with 76 percent of schools operating either with hybrid or 
in-person instruction. Like the Tulane study, this study examined COVID-19 cases prior to much 
of the surge of cases in the winter of 2020-21. The research team found that in-person modality 
options are not associated with increased spread of COVID-19 at low levels of pre-existing 
COVID-19 cases but did find that cases increase at moderate to high pre-existing COVID-19 rates. 
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Again, the analysis raises questions as to which set of results are more relevant to the COVID-19 
conditions of the winter. 
We complement these other concurrent studies by examining a state where conditions may 
have been less than ideal for a safe reopening. First, Texas had relatively high rates of COVID-19 
spread in early fall of 2020 that roughly mirrored the national conditions that would emerge toward 
the end of the semester. To illustrate, Figure 2 shows weekly COVID-19 cases per 100,000 
residents in Texas compared to Washington, Michigan, and the U.S. as a whole during the latter 
half of 2020. The vertical lines delineate the weeks of June 20 through October 16 – a four-month 
period centered on the modal reopening date in our Texas data, and a similar period to that used in 
the Tulane and CALDER studies. Texas’ rate of new cases was substantially greater than those of 
Washington, Michigan, and the overall U.S. during early fall when the bulk of Texas’ schools 
reopened for in-person instruction. 
Additionally, many states opened schools using hybrid models where only partial numbers 
of students attended schools each day to allow for greater social distancing. In contrast, most Texas 
schools opened at near capacity. For instance, in reviewing school opening plans of Texas school 
districts, our best estimate is that over 90 percent of school districts opened fully in-person without 
any staggered or phased-in attendance. This is in contrast to 42 percent nationally (Harris et al., 
2021). In addition, using Texas’ Department of State Health Services data on the proportion of 
students attending in person by late September, we found that out of the 1,049 school districts, 358 
had over 90 percent of their students attending in person with 27 having 100 percent.8 Moreover, 
studies have shown that residents of politically conservative areas – such as the majority of Texas 
– are less likely to follow social distancing and mask-wearing recommendations than those in 
 




politically liberal areas (Milosh et al, 2020). This could influence the impact of reopening schools 
on COVID-19 spread in several ways, possibly including weaker enforcement of guidelines at 
schools and extracurricular activities, greater increases in mobility among parents, a stronger 
signal to the community that life can return to normal, and less willingness to impose compensatory 
other aspects of life. 
The Texas context offers other advantages as well. Texas allowed districts more discretion 
in when to open schools than many other states, allowing us to examine the effect of variation in 
timing of school openings in the context of common statewide mitigation policy, thereby reducing 
the possibility of omitted variable bias from other restrictions.9 In addition, in contrast to the 
Tulane and CALDER studies, which observed only a portion of schools open, every school district 
in the state eventually opened schools during the time frame of our study. This allows for an 
examination of wide-ranging school districts including rural and urban, large and small, and non-
diverse and racially diverse. In the CALDER and Tulane studies, open schools were 
disproportionally rural. Finally, Texas has a large number of school districts and counties, which 
provides statistical power to detect effects. As a source of comparison, while Texas has 254 
counties and 1,049 school districts,10 Michigan has 83 counties and 810 school districts and 
Washington has 39 counties and 286 school districts.  
III. Data 
To collect information for each school district’s start date and modality, we performed 
Google searches in which a team of assistants searched for key terms using district name and the 
 
9 Restrictions can vary within states, but we were unable to find any instances of cities or counties in Texas 
imposing or eliminating policies like shelter-in-place orders or mask mandates during our sample period. 
10 One county (Loving) has no schools within the county.   
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phrase “back to school plan”.11 The vast majority of districts had a back-to-school plan and it often 
included both the district’s modality plan for instruction and the school district start date. If the 
school district started with virtual instruction, the back-to-school plan often listed the planned date 
for in-person instruction.12 In cases in which the start date was not listed, the team of assistants 
searched for the school district’s academic calendar. In cases where back-to-school plans or 
calendars were not available, we also conducted newspaper and Facebook searches to identify this 
information through news stories and school district’s Facebook posts.13 Even in cases where a 
back-to-school plan and/or academic calendars were available, we often conducted additional 
newspaper or Facebook searches to verify the district’s start date and modality of instruction. 
Because COVID-19 cases and fatalities are only available at the county level, we need to 
aggregate the school reopening variable from the district to the county level, which requires 
accounting for the fact that not all districts within a county opened at the same time. In the Tulane 
study, the researchers defined treatment as occurring when the first district within a county 
reopened. However, for many districts in Texas, this definition would result in a county being 
labeled “treated” when only a small fraction of schools is actually open. Consider Bexar County, 
a large county that includes San Antonio. Southwest Independent School District (ISD), which 
 
11 Like the Tulane study, we did not include charter or private schools primarily because they represent a small 
minority of the total students in the states and also because it would have been difficult to ascertain this information.   
12 In some cases, districts phased in in-person attendance (e.g., Kindergarten through 3rd grade could attend in person 
one week and the following week the rest of the grades could attend in person). In these cases, we used the first date 
students were allowed on campus. If the district only allowed special education students on campus, we did not 
count this as in-person instruction given the small number of students on campus.  
13 After these steps, there were only 11 school districts in which we could not identify the start date and only 17 
school districts we could not identify the modality of instruction. We tried to follow up with each district with a 
phone call. Through these phone calls, we were able to identify the start date for seven of the 11 missing dates for 
school districts and the missing modality information for 12 of the 17 school districts. Therefore, we had missing 
dates for four school districts, which we imputed based on the median start date within their county. For modality, 
we had missing dates of five school districts, which we imputed as the majority instructional modality of the school 
districts within the county. These are very small districts, with the average size of the missing start date districts 
being 78 students and the average size of the districts with missing modality information being 177 students. Since 
our data will be population-weighted, these districts are effectively inconsequential to the results. 
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represents less than 5 percent of the county’s student enrollment, was the first district to open 
schools on August 24, 2020. However, there were some districts within the county that opened up 
schools as late as seven weeks later and six school districts representing 75 percent of the county’s 
student population opened on September 8, 2020. In this case, defining treatment based on the 
earliest opening school district would effectively lead to it being assigned two weeks too early 
relative to the most consequential shock. Therefore, our primary treatment definition is the week 
in which the county had the largest jump in percentage of county students who could attend a 
school in person. In the case of Bexar County, that would be the week of September 8th.14 We 
should also note that treatment begins for our empirical analysis once schools open for any type 
of in-person instruction including fully in-person, phased-in (e.g., a subset of grades open for in-
person instruction with gradual number of grades eligible to attend in-person over time), or as a 
hybrid model (e.g., students attending in person part of the week and attending virtually the rest of 
the week). However, as discussed previously, phased-in and hybrid reopenings were rare in Texas. 
It should also be noted that in opening schools for in-person instruction, districts almost 
uniformly allowed families to choose to attend in-person or remotely. However, districts had to 
prepare for the possibility that all or nearly all students could attend in person. Therefore, our main 
treatment variable could be thought of as “intent-to-treat” (ITT) analysis as a district’s decision to 
provide in-person instruction is providing the opportunity for all students to attend in person. That 
said, schools in Texas tended to open at relatively close to full capacity as nearly 60 percent of all 
school districts had 80 percent or more of their students enrolled for in-person instruction by the 
end of September. Our analysis is also an ITT analysis in a second way. Once treatment begins by 
 
14 Later, we present a series of analyses that suggests our results are robust to alternative definitions of treatment 
including using the first school district that opened schools in person, 50 percent of the county enrollment is open 
for in-person instruction, and 20 percent of the county enrollment is open for in-person instruction.   
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a school district opening schools for in-person instruction, we consider the school opened 
throughout the analysis, even if the school has a temporary shutdown as a result of an outbreak. In 
defining treatment in this way, our estimates should be seen as conservative estimates.  
Our COVID-19 data come from the Texas Department of State Health Services 
(TDSHS).15 Numbers of COVID-19 cases, fatalities, and tests are recorded daily at the county 
level from May 3, 2020 through January 3, 2021. We use weekly (Sunday through Saturday) data 
instead of daily data because not all labs are open daily or do not report daily (e.g., many labs are 
not open on weekends) and can have duplicate numbers or reporting errors, which can lead to 
oscillating numbers from one day to the next. By using weekly numbers, we are largely able to 
smooth out these fluctuations.16 To account for variations in county population, we calculated 
COVID-19 cases, fatalities, and tests per 100,000 residents using 2019 county population estimates 
from the Census Bureau.17 These cases and fatalities variables will be our main outcome variables, 
while the testing variable will be a control in the cases regressions. 
To help understand potential spillover effects of school reopenings on adult mobility, we 
utilize Social Distancing Metrics (Version 2.1, “SDM”) data provided by SafeGraph, Inc., from 
May 3, 2020 to January 3, 2021.18 SafeGraph collects information on almost 45 million cellular 
phone users, including about 10 percent of devices in the U.S. The sample correlates very highly 
with the true Census populations with respect to distribution by county, educational attainment, 
 
15 https://dshs.texas.gov/coronavirus/additionaldata.aspx  
16 It should be noted that some data errors within the TDSHS data systems have been discovered over time as 
documented by media accounts: https://www.khou.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/texass-record-high-covid-
positivity-rate-falls-after-data-experts-investigate/287-ffc19167-0d47-4be9-8c06-8648229288ef and 
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/09/24/texas-coronavirus-response-data/. Corrections to these errors could cause 
accumulated cases or tests to decrease over time as the data are corrected. These anomalies should create noise, but 
not bias and should largely be accounted for in our analysis using week fixed effects. 




and income.19 These data are aggregated from GPS pings provided by cellular devices that have 
opted-in to location sharing services from smartphone applications. The device data is aggregated 
by Census Block Group (CBG) and day, based on a device’s “home” location.20 In our timeframe, 
there were 15,705 CBG’s overall in the Texas SDM; on an average day, more than 1.9 million 
devices were followed in Texas. For our analysis, we restricted the sample to a balanced panel of 
14,580 CBG’s (with more than 1.6 million overall devices on an average day).21 The typical CBG 
had approximately 112 devices. We created samples at the weekly level for the full week (Monday 
through Sunday), for weekdays (Monday through Friday), and for weekends (Saturday and 
Sunday). 
We utilize four of the mobility measures provided in the SDM that are often used in other 
studies. The most commonly used measure is the fraction of devices that do not leave their home 
location during a given day (“Percent Completely Home”).22 We also use two “work” measures. 
SafeGraph defines “work” as either the fraction of devices that spent more than 6 hours at a non-
home location between 8am-6pm (“Percent Full Time”) or fraction of devices that spent between 
4-6 hours at a non-home location between 8am-6pm (“Percent Part Time”).23 Finally, several 
 
19 https://www.safegraph.com/blog/what-about-bias-in-the-safegraph-dataset 
20 To impute a “home” location for a cellphone user, SafeGraph considers a common nighttime location of each 
mobile device. In the entire United States, the SDM is aggregated to approximately 220,000 CBGs. To enhance 
privacy, CBG’s are excluded if they have fewer than five devices observed in a month. 
21 CBG’s were excluded if (a) the CBG was not observed for all days in our sample period, (b) the CBG could not 
be merged to demographic information from the 2018 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates, (c) the 
CBG’s population – according to the 2018 ACS – was in the bottom or top 1 percent of the full distribution 
(corresponding to 391 and 7150, respectively), or (d) over the course of the panel, relative to the mean device count 
in the CBG, any specific CBG-day observation had a device count that more than twice the mean or less than half 
the mean. By restricting to CBG’s with relatively stable numbers of devices over the long panel, we hope to avoid 
complications related to installation and removal of apps, inactive devices, and sample attrition highlighted in some 
other studies (Andersen et al., 2020; Allcott et al., 2020). Although Safegraph reports that some apps implement 
GPS collection methods that depend on the movement of the device (rather than a fixed time interval), this would 
likely affect levels of certain metrics (e.g., completely home all day) but not changes. 
22 See Bailey et al. (2020), Bullinger et al. (forthcoming), Cronin and Evans (2020), Allcott et al. (2020), Dave et al. 
(2020a), Simonov et al. (2020), Dave et al. (2021), Friedson et al. (Forthcoming), and Gupta et al. (2020). 
23 See Bullinger et al. (forthcoming) and Simonov et al. (2020). 
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studies have examined median time spent away from home (or at home).24 These measures are 
based on the observed minutes outside of home (or at home) throughout the day, regardless of 
whether these time episodes are contiguous. The time during which a smartphone is turned off is 
not counted towards the measures. 
Finally, for some of our analyses, we utilize county-level variables from other sources. The 
county’s college enrollment is available from the U.S. Department of Education National Center 
for Educational Statistics (NCES).25 Percent of voters who voted for President Trump in the 2016 
presidential election comes from the MIT Election and Data Science Lab (2018). We control for 
average weekly temperature, precipitation, and snowfall using data collected by the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Global Historical Climatology 
Network. 
Our main analysis sample contains a balanced event-time window surrounding treatment, 
i.e. the week of the county’s largest increase in percentage of students who can attend in-person 
school. For the COVID-19 outcomes, we include eight weeks prior to treatment, the treatment 
week, and eight weeks after treatment. A lengthy post-treatment period allows for multiple rounds 
of spread (e.g. from student to parent to grandparent), incubation periods, time to receive and 
obtain results from a test, and the fact that deaths can occur weeks after infection. On the other 
 
24 See Allcott et al. (2020), Dave et al. (2020a), Cotti et al. (forthcoming), and Gupta et al. (2020). 
25 These data were collected at http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/elsi/.The reporting years of enrollment ranged from 2013-
2017. As part of the data cleaning process, for residential campuses only, we assumed all enrolled students could 
attend classes in person and therefore, we calculated the maximum weekly proportion of the total county population 
that could be on campus by dividing the number of enrolled students by the county population. To calculate the 
daily proportion of college students of the total county population, we assumed that no students were on campus 
during the summer (nearly all colleges did online instruction over the summer). We also assumed all residential 
colleges had in-person classes for the fall semester. For those colleges with no residential students, we assumed the 
colleges were providing instruction either online or had minimal student interactions. Using Google searches of 
academic calendars, we identified the start date for each college, which is the day we assumed students began 
interacting on campus. In many counties, there are multiple colleges with different start dates, which means the 
college proportion changes over time as more and more colleges start their fall sessions. 
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hand, a long post-treatment period faces a relatively high risk of confounding from other 
concurrent shocks. In our case, the holiday break – which started in many Texas districts after the 
week of December 13 – is a particular concern, as schools being “reopened” should not influence 
spread when they are not in session. In our view, an eight week post-treatment window best 
balances these considerations. It is long enough to plausibly capture much of the dynamics of the 
treatment effect. At the same time, it is short enough to avoid sample windows that stretch past the 
week of December 13 for all but two small counties (Starr and Zavala) that will have little influence 
in our population-weighted sample. For the SafeGraph mobility outcomes, there is not a clear 
reason to expect a lag before treatment effects emerge, so we limit the event-time window to six 
weeks on each side, thereby ensuring that the sample window does not extend past the week of 
December 13 for any county.  
Table 1 shows means and standard deviations for our outcome variables in both the pre- 
and post-treatment periods, weighted by population. Interestingly, new cases per capita were about 
the same in the pre- and post-treatment periods, while death rates went down by almost 50 percent. 
This was in spite of a moderate increase in mobility across all four measures. Of course, numerous 
factors affect these flat or downward trends, including better understanding of preventive measures 
such as mask-wearing, advancements in treatments, and the average age of cases gradually 
becoming younger. A finer-grained econometric analysis is necessary to disentangle the causal 
effects of school reopenings from these underlying trends.  
Table 2 shows results from a simple cross-sectional regression of week of reopening 
(ranging from 14 to 28, with week 1 being the week of May 3) on several county-level variables 
that might be expected to influence reopening decisions: President Trump’s 2016 vote share, 
percent Hispanic, percent Black, county population, and percent of the SafeGraph sample who 
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stayed completely at home for the day in the four weeks prior to any schools reopening (a proxy 
for compliance with public health guidelines), and average weekly new cases per capita in the four 
weeks prior to any schools reopening. We standardize the covariates to allow a direct interpretation 
of the magnitudes. Trump vote share is the dominant predictor, which is consistent with previous 
research that showed politics drove school opening decisions (Valant, 2020). Each standard 
deviation increase in Trump vote share is associated with schools reopening 1.22 weeks sooner. In 
contrast, none of the other variables are statistically significant, and none have a magnitude greater 
than 0.17 weeks. The coefficient for pre-school-year caseloads is nearly zero, and its p-value is 
nearly 0.9. Therefore, reopening decisions appear to have been driven much more heavily by 
politics than public health considerations, which may be surprising but is consistent with prior 
research (Valant, 2020). This can be seen as favorable for an econometric analysis, as it suggests 
that reverse causality from caseloads influencing reopening decisions should not be a concern. We 
will be able to account for stable county characteristics such as political views by including county 
fixed effects. 
IV. Econometric Methods 
We aim to identify the causal effects of school reopenings on new weekly COVID-19 cases 
and fatalities per 100,000 residents by estimating event-study regression models of the form 
𝑦𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑖
8
𝑖=−8,𝑖≠−1
𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑐,𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼𝑐 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡                 (1) 
where the subscripts c and t represent county and week; y is the case or fatality outcome; 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁 
is the reopening indicator; 𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑆 is a control variable for the number of COVID-19 tests per 
19 
 
100,000 residents,26 included since differential testing rates across locations and time can be an 
important driver of confirmed case numbers; 𝛼 and 𝜏 are county and time fixed effects; and 𝜀 is 
the error term. Observations are weighted by county population, and standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by county.  
The summation term for the treatment variable reflects the inclusion of separate indicator 
variables for whether schools will reopen eight weeks after week t, seven weeks after, six weeks 
after, etc., down to two weeks after; whether schools reopened exactly in week t; and whether 
schools reopened one week before week t, two weeks before, etc., up to eight weeks before. The 
variable for whether schools will reopen one week from now is omitted as the reference period. 
The “lead” terms (weeks until school reopening) measure pre-treatment trends, while the “lag” 
terms (weeks after school reopening) measure the evolution of the treatment effects over time. As 
discussed above, we expect the effects on new cases to grow over time because of the incubation 
period, the lag between symptom onset and receiving a test, the time required to obtain test results, 
and the exponential nature of case growth. For fatalities, we expect an even longer lag since deaths 
typically occur after an extended battle with the illness. 
We also estimate a number of variants of our baseline event-study specification as 
robustness checks. The first three checks add variables in an effort to address possible omitted 
variable bias concerns. Causal inference in our event-study model requires the assumption that 
case and death trajectories would have evolved similarly in early versus late reopening counties in 
the counterfactual in which schools did not reopen. The pre-treatment trends estimated using the 
lead terms in the event-study model are informative as to how case and death trajectories would 
 
26 Since test results might not be recorded in the same week that the test was conducted, we experimented with 
including lags of the testing variable, finding that the contemporaneous value as well as two weekly lags were 
statistically significant. We therefore include all three of those variables in the regressions. 
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have evolved in the counterfactual scenario. However, it is possible that some confounders did not 
emerge until the post-treatment period. For instance, most Texas colleges and universities opened 
for in-person instruction at the start of the fall semester. If these post-secondary reopenings fueled 
COVID-19 spread and if school reopening dates were also systematically correlated with the 
prevalence of college students in the county, this could bias our estimators for the school reopening 
coefficients. We therefore estimate a model that controls for college and university reopenings in 
a dose-response, event-study manner. Specifically, we construct a variable for the proportion of a 
county’s population that attends an in-session post-secondary institution in a given week. We then 
interact this continuous “dosage” measure with indicators for each of the eight weeks before and 
after the first college reopening in the county. Our second robustness check controls for time-
varying unobservables more generally by including linear county-specific time trends.  
For our third check, recall that the results from Table 2 showed that vote share for President 
Trump was the dominant predictor of reopening week. Residents’ political views are presumably 
fixed during a two-month sample period, meaning that they are captured by the county fixed 
effects. However, it is possible that political views could influence not only levels of new COVID-
19 cases but also trends, and county fixed effects alone would not account for the latter. If heavily 
Republican counties opened schools relatively early and also developed steeper COVID-19 
trajectories in the fall for reasons besides school reopenings, our estimated effects of reopenings 
would be biased upwards. We therefore estimate a model that adds interactions of time-invariant 
Trump vote share with each week fixed effect, thereby flexibly allowing for right- and left-leaning 
counties to have different COVID-19 trajectories. 
The next series of robustness checks utilize alternate constructions of the key variables. 
First, instead of defining reopening as occurring in the week with the largest increase in the 
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percentage of a county’s students who attend schools that reopened for in-person learning, we use 
the week during which the county (a) crossed over the 50 percent threshold for students attending 
reopened schools, (b) crossed over the 20 percent threshold, and (c) had its first reopening. The 
latter is the treatment definition used by the Tulane study. Next, two checks consider alternate 
functional forms for the case and fatality outcomes: (a) exponential growth rate in cumulative cases 
(computed as the difference in the natural logs of cumulative cases from one week to the next) and 
(b) the natural log of the count of new cases.  
Our next two checks vary the way in which we control for COVID-19 testing, since 
changes over time in the number of tests performed could be endogenous to the trajectory of new 
infections. First, we simply drop the testing variables. Second, we control for the number of new 
negative tests per 100,000 residents rather than total tests, as those might arguably reflect availably 
of tests rather than level of virus in the community.27 
The next group of robustness checks varies sample construction. Two checks shorten the 
sample window from eight weeks on each side of treatment to six and four, respectively. Next, we 
test whether the results could be driven by a small number of unusual counties by dropping (a) the 
county of El Paso, which experienced dramatically more COVID-19 spread than any other county 
in Texas during our sample period, and (b) all six counties with more than a million residents. 
Finally, we consider a different way to ensure that the results are not driven exclusively by large, 
urban areas by re-estimating the baseline model without weighting observations by county 
population, thereby making the estimates reflective of effects in the average county (with each 
county counting equally), as opposed to average effects across Texas as a whole. We also examine 
 
27 Note that, since we did not control for testing in the baseline fatalities regression, we do not perform the 
robustness checks involving testing for that outcome. 
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the robustness of the findings by re-estimating the main model leaving out one county at a time, 
for the six largest counties with population exceeding one million. 
Finally, an emerging literature documents problems with two-way fixed-effects (TWFE) 
models with staggered treatment times.28 First, TWFE regressions give more weight to 
observations treated in the middle of the sample period, which can lead to unreliable estimates of 
the average treatment effect if treatment effects are heterogeneous. Using the event-study 
formulation with a balanced panel and a sample period centered around treatment time rather than 
calendar time alleviates this concern. Since each county has exactly eight pre-treatment 
observations, one observation during the treatment week, and exactly eight post-treatment 
observations, the variance of each treatment variable is identical for each county.  
More troublesome in our context is that, in settings that rely exclusively on variation in 
treatment timing for identification as opposed to having control units, two-way fixed effects 
models implicitly use early treated units as controls for later treated units. This leads to bias when 
treatment effects are dynamic because the response of the early treated units is still evolving at the 
time that they are called upon to be controls, effectively leading to a violation of the parallel trends 
assumption for those particular late-versus-early comparisons. Event-study models do not 
necessarily alleviate this concern. Under the assumption that the treatment effect either strengthens 
or stays the same over time, the bias is toward zero and we can conclude that, if anything, our 
estimates are conservative. We find this assumption plausible for COVID-19 outcomes; as 
discussed above, all the reasons to expect treatment effects to evolve over time point towards them 
becoming stronger rather than weaker.  
 
28 This literature includes Callaway and Sant’ Anna (forthcoming), de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020), 
Goodman-Bacon (forthcoming), and Sun and Abraham (2020). Our discussion in the remainder of this section is 
based on reviews of this emerging literature by Baker et al. (2021) and Cunningham (2021, pp. 461-510).  
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Nonetheless, we conduct two robustness checks that utilize newly developed methods that 
address this issue. Both of these methods perform well in simulations and applications conducted 
by Baker et al. (2021). First, we employ the “stacked regression” strategy used by Cengiz et al.’s 
(2019) study of four decades of state minimum wage increases. This method begins by 
constructing new datasets for each treatment event (each county’s school reopening) along with 
corresponding “clean controls”, defined as those counties whose school reopenings did not occur 
within eight weeks on either side of the reopening week of the focal county. Then, we combine 
the resulting datasets into a single “stacked” sample and re-run the baseline regression, except 
adding interactions of indicators for each underlying dataset with each of the county and week 
fixed effects (as well as, when COVID-19 cases is the outcome, the testing controls). Standard 
errors are clustered by county to prevent the duplication of data from leading to over-rejection of 
the null hypotheses. Our other robustness check implements the method of Callaway and Sant’ 
Anna (forthcoming), which first estimates dynamic treatment effects for units treated at each time 
period, then combines them by weighting by sample share rather than treatment variance. This 
method also purges the potentially problematic late-treated versus early-treated-as-control 
comparisons from the identifying variation.29,30   
V. Results 
 
29 To implement this method, we use the open-source STATA and R packages provided by Jonathan Roth and Pedro 
Sant’Anna (footnote: https://github.com/jonathandroth/staggered#stata-implementation). For COVID-19 cases, the 
method requires us to drop three counties that are the only county treated in a particular week. For fatalities, we 
encounter a problem with singular variance matrix because small counties tend to have weeks in which there were 
zero deaths reported. We therefore limit the sample to counties with more than 19,000 residents and shorten the 
event study window to seven periods before and after reopening to avoid unbalanced treatment groups. 
30 Note that we do not also present results from the Goodman-Bacon (forthcoming) decomposition because that is 
designed for two-way fixed effects models with a single treatment variable, rather than for event-study models like 
ours with numerous treatment variables. That said, if we run a basic TWFE regression with a single treatment 
variable, the decomposition shows that the treatment effect estimate is driven roughly equally by early-treatment 
versus late-treated-as-control and late-treatment versus early-treated-as-control comparisons. The estimated 
treatment effect from the former is more strongly positive than that from the latter, consistent with dynamic 
treatment effects causing a bias toward zero when early-treated units are used as controls, as discussed above.  
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Figure 3 displays the event-study results for the baseline model with new COVID-19 cases 
per 100,000 residents as the outcome. The dots indicate the coefficient estimates for each week of 
event time relative to the reference period of one week before reopening. The bars represent 95 
percent confidence intervals, meaning that a variable is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level if its bar does not cross the horizontal zero line. As a point of reference for evaluating 
magnitudes, recall from Table 1 that the pre-treatment sample mean for the dependent variable is 
147.7 cases per 100,000. 
The results provide evidence of a positive, large, and causally interpretable effect of 
reopening schools on COVID-19 cases per 100,000 residents. The coefficient estimates associated 
with the negative event time terms show little evidence of problematic pre-treatment trends. The 
line is nearly straight, the point estimates are all negative but never larger than 33.5 (22.7 percent 
of the sample mean), and only one of the eight estimates is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level relative to the reference period. The coefficient estimates from the post-treatment period 
show that a statistically significant increase in cases emerges two weeks after reopening, consistent 
with the expected lag between exposure and confirmation as a case. The effect then grows over 
time before stabilizing in weeks six through eight at slightly over 100 new cases per 100,000 
residents. This effect size is substantial, as it represents more than two-thirds of the pre-treatment 
sample mean. The confidence intervals are large, but even the low end of the 95 percent confidence 
interval for the week eight coefficient estimate would represent a non-trivial 17 percent increase 
relative to the pre-treatment mean. 
The results from the robustness checks for new cases, shown in Appendix Figures A1 
through A7, are broadly similar. In all regressions, the estimated effect of reopening schools is 
positive, with magnitudes and levels of statistical significance that exhibit the general pattern of 
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strengthening over time (although individual coefficient estimates occasionally deviate from that 
pattern). In the thirteen robustness checks that have magnitudes that can be compared to those from 
the baseline specification (the exceptions being the two with dependent variables that have 
different scales), the coefficient estimates eight weeks after reopening range from 75 to 194 new 
cases per 100,000. The baseline estimate of 108 is therefore towards the more conservative end of 
this range. 
Figure 4 shows the baseline results for weekly deaths per 100,000 residents, which has a 
pre-treatment mean of 3.51. As with cases, the results suggest a positive causal effect of school 
reopenings. No clear pattern emerges in the pre-treatment period, and none of the eight negative 
event time terms are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. A statistically significant 
increase in deaths emerges two weeks after reopening, and the effect strengthens over time, 
reaching 2.37 after eight weeks. This magnitude again represents more than two-thirds of the pre-
treatment sample mean, and the low end of the 95 percent confidence interval is a still sizeable 
0.97, or 28 percent of the pre-treatment mean. 
The results from the robustness checks, presented in Appendix Figures A8 through A13, 
are again broadly similar in terms of signs and significance. In the regressions where magnitudes 
are directly comparable, the effect after eight weeks ranges from 0.88 to 4.6, putting our baseline 
estimate of 2.37 towards the middle. While the general pattern of positive and strengthening effects 
persists across specifications, the standard errors tend to be much larger (as a percent of the 
outcome mean) for the deaths regressions than the cases regressions, and individual coefficient 
estimates therefore lose statistical significance in some of the checks more frequently. In particular, 
the standard errors in the late event time periods are extremely large using the Callaway and Sant’ 
Anna method, making it impossible for plausible effect sizes to be statistically significant. 
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However, that regression nonetheless produces some of the largest point estimates out of all the 
robustness checks, with the increase in deaths per 100,000 residents reaching 4 after eight weeks. 
Finally, in Appendix Figure A14, we show the coefficient on the event study model from 
week +8, leaving out one large county at a time for the six counties in Texas with population 
exceeding one million. The conclusions for both cases and fatalities are very similar from all 
specifications, suggesting that the results are not driven by any one large county. 
In order to help assess the practical significance of the results, we utilize the estimates from 
the baseline models for cases and fatalities to predict how Texas’ COVID-19 trajectory would 
have evolved differently if schools had not reopened. As discussed above, the generally large 
confidence intervals associated with our estimates mean that relying exclusively on point estimates 
for these calculations could be misleading. We therefore also perform a more conservative 
simulation using the low end of the estimates’ 95 percent confidence intervals. 
First, we compute the predicted number of cases attributable to school reopenings. Our 
point estimates for reopening in the present week, the prior week, two weeks ago, and so on out to 
eight weeks ago, are 11.78, 20.96, 58.97, 42.35, 61.68, 58.27, 100.39, 109.91, and 109.99, 
respectively. These estimates imply that at the end of the reopening week, there would have been 
11.78 fewer cases per 100,000 residents. The first full post-treatment week adds another 20.96 
extra cases per 100,000 residents, for a total of 32.74. After eight post-treatment weeks, the 
cumulative number of extra cases is the sum of all nine coefficient estimates, which is 574.3 per 
100,000 residents. Since our regression is weighted by population, our estimates are interpretable 
as average effects across all of Texas. Therefore, the total number of extra cases is given by 
multiplying 574.3 by the state’s population of 28,995,712 and then dividing by 100,000, yielding 
166,521. According to our data, there were a total of 373,323 new cases in Texas in the nine weeks 
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included in our post-treatment window (including the treatment week itself). Therefore, the point 
estimates imply that Texas’ caseload would have been almost 45 percent lower during that time 
had schools not reopened. 
As stated above, we caution against a literal interpretation of that number given the 
relatively wide confidence intervals associated with our estimates. A safer interpretation can be 
obtained by instead using the low end of the 95 percent confidence interval to determine the 
minimum number of cases attributable to school reopenings implied by our results. The low end 
of the 95 percent confidence intervals associated with the variables for the treatment week and 
each of the eight post-treatment weeks are -2.88, -13.67, 9.39, -2.72, 12.74, 5.30, 51.12, 55.5, and 
33.37, for a total of 148.15. Scaling up to the population of Texas yields a minimum of 42,956 
cases attributable to school reopenings in the nine subsequent weeks, or 11.5 percent of the state’s 
total caseload during that time. 
The same process can be used to compute the number of fatalities attributable to school 
reopenings. The baseline regression’s point estimates for the treatment week and eight post-
treatment week variables are 0.35, 0.61, 0.91, 1.3, 1.21, 1.51, 1.98, and 2.36, for a total of 2.36 
deaths per 100,000 residents, or 3,021 across the state of Texas. The corresponding low ends of 
the 95 percent confidence intervals are -0.05, 0.18, 0.35, 0.54, 0.44, 0.61, 0.83, and 1,07, which 
sum to 1.07 fatalities per 100,000 residents, or 818 total across the state. During the time frame, 
there were 4,796 COVID-19 fatalities in Texas, so the point estimates imply that 63 percent of 
them were due to school reopenings, while the confidence intervals imply that at least 17 percent 
of them were.  
In sum, even under conservative assumptions, reopening schools had a meaningful impact 
on both COVID-19 cases and associated fatalities in Texas. It is noteworthy that the percentage 
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impacts on both outcomes are roughly similar. Ex ante, one might have expected the increase in 
deaths to be much smaller proportionally than the rise in cases. COVID-19 mortality rates are 
nearly zero for children and are much smaller for the working-age adults who comprise the 
majority of school teachers and staff than they are for elderly or vulnerable adults. Our results 
therefore suggest that school-reopening-induced COVID-19 spread is reaching more vulnerable 
segments of the population. One possible explanation is secondary spread, where infected kids or 
employees spread the virus to older, more at-risk individuals. However, this explanation appears 
incomplete, as it would imply a several-week lag between new cases and new deaths, which we 
do not observe in the data. Another possibility is spillover effects, where schools opening signals 
to the community that it is safe to return to normal activities including returning to in-person work, 
leading to spread across all segments of the population that may not originate in schools. Such 
indirect effects could also help to explain the large effect sizes. The next section explores the 
possibility of spillovers more directly. 
VI. Spillover Effects on Mobility 
We next use SafeGraph data to explore whether changes in mobility patterns among adults 
may help to explain the large sizes of the effects of school reopenings on COVID-19 cases and 
deaths. Our baseline regression is again an event-study model given by (1), with the reopening 
variable defined by the largest potential week-to-week increase in in-person enrollment. However, 
we make three small changes in order to customize the approach for mobility outcomes. First, in 
contrast to the lags inherent in COVID-19 cases and deaths, effects on mobility can emerge 
immediately, and it is not obvious that they will evolve over time. Therefore, we shorten the 
window on each side of treatment to six weeks rather than eight, which prevents any counties’ 
post-treatment windows from extending into the holiday break. The analysis therefore uses 13 
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weeks of data, and given our numbering convention, goes from -6 weeks to +6 weeks (where we 
denote week 0 as the week of school reopening within the county). Second, we now arrange weeks 
from Monday to Sunday, rather than Sunday to Saturday as we did in our models for COVID-19 
spread, so that we can also examine weekday mobility separately from weekend mobility in some 
specifications. Third, instead of omitting the lead one week prior to school reopening as the 
reference category, we omit the lead two weeks prior, since preparation for a return to school could 
plausibly increase mobility in the week prior to reopening. For example, families may return from 
vacations or may engage in more back-to-school shopping. 
There are three primary ways in which school reopenings can lead to spillover effects 
beyond the students who attend school and the teachers and staff who work there. First – and most 
directly – in-person learning may increase transmission between students and teachers, ultimately 
leading to secondary spread into the larger community. The CDC guidelines emphasize ideal 
conditions for in-person learning to succeed, including low initial levels of community spread, 
adequate social distancing, vigilant mask wearing, and a host of other steps that are unlikely to be 
fully carried out in practice. Second, opening of schools is associated with other indirect changes 
for parents due to decreased childcare responsibilities. This could include either greater physical 
presence in workplaces or increased outside-the-home leisure activities, both of which could lead 
to greater transmission and community spread. Finally, reopening schools could send an incorrect 
signal to the larger community that normal activities are safe again, similar to the “learning by 
deregulation” concept described in Glaeser et al. (2020). Such a signaling effect could even extend 
to those – such as seniors – with no direct ties to students or school employees. 
We examine SafeGraph mobility data to explore these possible mechanisms. We aggregate 
SafeGraph’s SDM database to the weekly level (averaging mobility measures across the week), 
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where our unit of observation is a CBG, which we will refer to as a “neighborhood.” After a 
number of screens to the SDM data (discussed in the data section earlier), we examine 14,580 
neighborhoods from 252 of the 254 Texas counties. Our four mobility measures, following 
SafeGraph’s SDM conventions, are percentage of devices completely at home, percent part-time 
work, percent full-time work, and median minutes outside of the dwelling; SafeGraph’s 
convention is to define part-time (full-time) “work” as spending 3-6 hours (6 or more hours) at 
one location other than home between 8 am and 6 pm local time.31 
Using these SafeGraph definitions, in the weeks prior to reopening, approximately 28 
percent of devices were completely home on a given day, and nearly 8 percent were engaged in 
part-time work and 4 percent in full-time work on a daily basis. In addition, the median time spent 
outside of the home on a given day was 108 minutes. 
The event-study specifications provide evidence of increased mobility. As illustrated in 
Figure 5, only one out of sixteen pre-trend coefficients from six to three weeks prior to reopening 
are significantly different from the lead term two weeks prior to reopening. There is some evidence 
of anticipation effects in the week immediately prior to reopening with significant increases in 
work behavior. Starting in the week of reopening, and essentially thereafter, there is strong 
evidence of increased mobility. In the first week of school reopening (week 0), there is a reduction 
in staying completely home of 0.7 percentage points, increases in part-time and full-time work of 
0.4 percentage points, and increases in time outside the home of more than 8 minutes. These results 
persist – and all grow substantially larger – in the subsequent weeks. For example, in week 6, the 
mobility results are two to three times as large. and time outside the home increases by 20 minutes. 





in completely at home per day, increases of 12 percent and 21 percent in part and full time work, 
and increases of 18 percent in time outside the home. 
Next, we examine these mobility patterns in another way. Schools operate during 
weekdays, not weekends. Thus, increases in daily mobility induced by school openings (e.g., 
children at school, parental labor supply) should be more prominent on weekdays. When we run 
the same event study models on weekdays only in Figure 6a, the mobility effects are much 
stronger, suggesting these mechanisms are operating as expected. To illustrate, in the full-week 
model, recall that there was a reduction in staying completely home of 0.7 percentage points in 
week 0; when focused on weekdays, there is now a 1.1 percentage point reduction. In the full week 
model, time outside the home increased by more than 8 minutes in week 0; when focused on 
weekdays, it is now nearly 13 minutes. By week 6, time outside the home increases by 30 minutes 
per day, considerably higher than the 20 minutes in the full week model. Relative to the pre-
treatment weekday mean of 116 minutes, this is an increase of 26 percent. When focusing on the 
weekend in Figure 6b, we generally find modest reductions in mobility, which may represent an 
overall reallocation of activities as the school year begins. For example, time outside the home 
falls by between 2 to 5 minutes per day in the weeks after reopening, although many of the 
coefficients are insignificant. The overall net effect – as represented by the full week – is clearly 
higher mobility. 
One key benefit of the SDM database is the level of granularity. The typical neighborhood 
in our sample has a population of approximately 1,500 people, and was merged to demographic 
data from ACS summary files for 2018 (which aggregates microdata from 2014-2018). 
Importantly, these neighborhood summary files contain detailed information on the age 
distribution. From this, we characterize neighborhoods in two different ways: whether they have 
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significant numbers of school-age children (fraction of population aged 5 to 17) and whether they 
have significant numbers of elderly (fraction of population aged 65 and over). We re-estimate our 
models, restricting to neighborhoods in the top quintile of school-age children (neighborhoods 
where, on average, approximately 25 percent of the population is comprised of school-aged 
children). We also re-estimate models for the top quintile of neighborhoods with elderly (where, 
on average, nearly 18 percent of the population are senior citizens). By focusing on neighborhoods 
with many children and parents, we expect increases in mobility due to both the resumption of 
school and any signaling effects. In contrast, in neighborhoods with large numbers of elderly, the 
effects of reopening schools and increased physical work presence should be diminished, although 
the general signal that normal activities are safe could still apply. 
The overall patterns in the event-study are somewhat stronger for the top quintile of 
neighborhoods with school-age children; as illustrated in Figure 7a, the median time away from 
home at 6 weeks after opening is nearly 27 minutes, compared with 20 minutes in the full sample. 
The pre-trends for all mobility measures show little change in mobility until school reopening, and 
then a highly significant and sizable increase thereafter. In contrast, the overall results are more 
muted in the elderly sample in Figure 7b. For example, median time away from home shows no 
significant increase after school reopenings, and the magnitude is substantively smaller; at 6 weeks 
post, time away insignificantly increases by 7 minutes. There is an increase in “full-time work” 
(recall, SafeGraph defines this based on extended stays outside the home, not whether the person 
is actually at work), yet the magnitudes are again considerably smaller than in neighborhoods with 
many children. Put differently, when focused on a sample that should largely be unaffected from 
reopenings or increased physical work presence, we see only limited evidence of mobility 
consistent with a signal of returning to normal. The results from this granular analysis would then 
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suggest mobility-induced increases from opening schools and potential spillovers onto parental 
behavior, especially labor supply. 
Finally, we re-examine our main mobility results with a series of robustness checks that 
largely mirror the results on COVID-19 in Appendix Figures A15 through A22. Appendix Figure 
A15 modifies the event-study specification by additionally including county-specific time trends. 
All of the substantive findings remain. For example, 6 weeks after opening, median time away 
from home is 20 minutes, virtually identical to the main specification. In Appendix Figure A16, 
the specification is amended to include weekly controls for average temperature, precipitation, and 
snowfall, factors that have been shown to affect mobility (Kapoor et al., 2020; Wilson, 2020). In 
all instances, none of the pre-trends from six to three weeks prior to reopening are different from 
the omitted lead of two week; additionally, the results on mobility virtually mirror the baseline, 
full-week results. Next, in Appendix Figure A17, we shorten the window to 4 weeks on either side 
of the school reopening. The same general patterns emerge as in the baseline specification. For 
example, in this specification, time away from home 4 weeks after reopening significantly 
increases by more than 15 minutes; in the base specification, it was 17 minutes. In Appendix 
Figures A18-A20, we modify the parameterization of school reopenings, by considering a county 
to be open if 50 percent, 20 percent, or any students had in-person learning offered to them. As the 
figures make clear, how one characterizes school reopening at the county level matters for the 
interpretation of the mobility results. In one case (50 percent threshold), there are essentially no 
mobility effects (and the pre-trends are generally insignificant). In other cases (20 percent 
threshold or greater than 0 percent), the pre-trends for many of the mobility measures are 
significant, yet there are no mobility impacts after the “opening”. Next, in Appendix Figure A21, 
we modify the baseline specification by including an interaction of Trump’s 2016 county vote 
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share with week fixed effects. The same general patterns remain as in the baseline, but some of 
the estimated impacts are smaller and insignificant. Thus, evolving attitudes of Trump voters 
appears to be related both to school openings and increased mobility. Finally, in Appendix Figure 
A22, we display the coefficient from week +6 from event study models that leave out the six largest 
Texas counties, each with population exceeding one million, one at a time. The estimated impacts 
on mobility are quite similar to the exercise, suggesting that none of the large counties are driving 
our results. 
Collectively, these results suggest that reopening schools leads to important spillover 
effects on adult mobility that may help to explain the large effect sizes for the COVID-19 
outcomes. The evidence is consistent with parents going physically back to work and perhaps also 
increasing outside-the-home leisure activities. These effects could be due to lessened child care 
responsibilities, signaling about the safety of returning to normal activities, or a combination of 
both. In contrast, the evidence is not as strong for neighborhoods with large numbers of elderly 
residents or for the general population on weekends, which may suggest that the time-use 
mechanism is relatively more important than general signaling. 
VII. Conclusion 
In this study, we examine the impact of opening Texas public schools for in-person 
instruction in fall 2020 on community spread of COVID-19 as well as fatalities. In the eight weeks 
after reopening, we conservatively estimate, based on lower bounds of confidence intervals, that 
there would have been at least 43,000 fewer COVID-19 cases and at least 800 fewer fatalities. 
These results hold across a variety of specifications and robustness checks. These results could be 
explained both by the direct effect of spread within the schools and the indirect effects of increased 
mobility within the community as our analysis of cellphone data suggests that six weeks after 
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reopening, the median time spent outside of the home increased by 26 percent on weekdays. This 
suggests that decision makers need to think strategically about how to encourage behavior to 
mitigate spread of COVID-19 not only within schools, but within the community at large. 
On the surface, our empirical findings diverge with several popular narratives that have 
emerged about school openings. Some studies – including a prominent CDC study from Wisconsin 
– rely on contract tracing efforts to quantify impacts of school reopening. The imperfections of 
run-of-the-mill contact tracing efforts – including the inability to follow asymptomatic cases or 
lack of cooperation in finding all close contacts – suggests estimates of in-school spread may be a 
lower bound. Importantly, this approach does not account for inevitable, indirect behaviors – such 
as greater parental mobility including increased physical presence in the workplace – which also 
may contribute to community spread. Although other recent research teams (Tulane, CALDER) 
take methodological approaches closer to our approach and find overall more modest effects on 
COVID-19 spread, it is important to emphasize that the initial conditions in Texas were more ripe 
for community spread and schools opened more widely, more quickly, and generally, close to full 
capacity. 
Although it is beyond the scope of our study to provide a cost-benefit analysis of school 
reopenings, our quantitative findings contribute a key input into such an analysis. Recent work by 
Kniesner and Sullivan (2020) estimate non-fatal economic losses of about $46,000 per case, and 
Department of Transportation apply an $11 million loss per fatality. Such health- and productivity-
related losses from COVID-19 must be weighed against learning losses for children, as well as 
other ancillary effects related to child mental health and abuse and these losses could be substantial 
but will only become clear over time. Distributional considerations are also important, as benefits 
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of school closures accrue disproportionately among older individuals, whereas the costs are largely 
borne by children. 
Obviously, as vaccinations expand, the cost-benefit calculations of opening schools 
changes. As of early April 2021, approximately 33 percent of adults aged 18 and older have been 
at least partially vaccinated, and the percentage is considerably higher among the most 
vulnerable.32 To the extent that the spread of new mutations of the virus are mitigated by vaccines, 
almost all policies that restrict mobility – including school closures – will eventually be 
unnecessary. Nonetheless, there continue to be pockets of high spread of COVID-19. Furthermore, 
among various groups, there is widespread vaccine hesitancy and mistrust of the medical system. 
For instance, in a survey conducted in February 2021, among white evangelical adults, 45 percent 
stated they would “definitely not” or “probably not” get the COVID-19 vaccine.33 In addition, 
vaccination rates are stubbornly low in both the African-American and Hispanic communities34, 
potentially due to historic mistrust of medical providers (Alsan and Wanamaker, 2018). As of April 
2021, Texas lags the national average in both partial and full vaccinations, as do many of the states 
in the South.35 Collectively, this suggests that there will be significant pockets of communities 
where lack of restrictions – including the opening of schools – may still lead to considerable 
community spread moving forward. Additionally, the B.1.1.7 variant that is gradually becoming 
the dominant strain in the U.S. infects children more easily than prior strains, and children under 
sixteen years old cannot yet be vaccinated. 36,37  
 
32 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/covid-19-vaccine-doses.html  
33 https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/03/23/10-facts-about-americans-and-coronavirus-vaccines/ft_21-03-
18_vaccinefacts/  
34 https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/latest-data-on-covid-19-vaccinations-race-ethnicity/  






For these reasons, debate about school openings and mitigation strategies will therefore 
likely continue to persist into the 2021-2022 school year, and our results provide important 
information that can help inform that debate. In particular, the CDC guidelines say that schools 
can reopen if community spread is low and considerable precautions are taken. Our study is not 
necessarily at odds with that guidance; instead, it simply shows that school reopenings are not 
always safe if those conditions are not met. 
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Outcome Variables 
   
 (1) (2) 
COVID Outcomes Pre-reopening Post-reopening 
New cases per 100,000 residents 147.73 139.74 
 
(121.37) (171.99) 
New deaths per 100,000 residents 3.51 1.80 
 
(5.45) (3.72) 
Observations 2,024 2,277 
   
Mobility Outcomes Pre-reopening Post-reopening 
Time Completely Home (%) 28.21 26.62 
 
(5.94) (5.72) 
Part-time Work (%) 7.84 9.00 
 
(2.25) (2.65) 
Full-time Work (%) 3.98 4.93 
 
(1.35) (1.69) 
Median non-home dwelling time (minutes) 107.76 128.25 
 
(56.42) (62.10) 
Observations 87,480 102,060 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The COVID outcomes utilize public county-by-week-level data, 
while the mobility outcomes are from census-block-group-by-week-level data from SafeGraph. Observations are 
weighted by county (census-block-group) population for the COVID (mobility) variables. The pre-reopening 
period refers to the eight (six) weeks prior to school reopenings for the COVID (mobility) variables. The post-
reopening period refers to the reopening week along with the eight (six) weeks following reopening for the 





Table 2: Predictors of Reopening Week 
 
Coefficient estimate  
(standard error) 
Standardized 2016 percent of votes for President Trump -1.18*** 
 
(0.30) 
Standardized percent Hispanic -0.19 
 
(0.15) 
Standardized percent Black -0.15 
 
(0.12) 
Standardized population 0.18 
 
(0.16) 
Standardized percent who stayed at home for full day 0.07 
 
(0.15) 







Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Results are from a cross-sectional county-level linear regression with 
week number of reopening (ranging from 14 to 28, with 1 indicating the week of May 3) as the outcome variable. 
The stay-at-home and new cases variables are pooled averages across the four weeks prior to the earliest school 





Figure 1: Relative Start Date of School District Start Date in 2020-21 School Year Relative 
to the 2019-20 School Year 
 
 
Note:  In some cases, we do not have the 2019-20 start date for school districts.  In these cases, we substitute a prior 
start date for any year we could find a record.    
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Figure 2. Weekly COVID-19 cases per 100,000 residents in Texas, Washington, Michigan, 





Figure 3: Event-Study Regression Results for Effect of Reopening Schools on COVID-19 







Figure 4: Event-Study Regression Results for Effect of Reopening Schools on COVID-19 



































Appendix Figures (online only) 
 
Appendix Figure A1. Robustness checks: (a) Control for college reopenings; (b) Control for county-
specific time trends; (c) Control for Trump vote share interacted with week fixed effects. 







Appendix Figure A2: Robustness checks: Alternative Treatment definitions for school reopenings:  








Appendix Figure A3: Robustness checks: (a) Outcome: cumulative cases exponential growth rate; (b) 

























Appendix Figure A6: Robustness checks: (a) Drop El Paso County; (b) Drop six counties w/ > 1 mil 








Appendix Figure A7: Robustness checks:  
(a) Stacked regression 
 
(b) Callaway and Sant’ Anna method 
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Appendix Figure A8: Robustness checks: (a) Control for college reopening; (b) Control for county-








Appendix Figure A9. Alternative Treatment definitions for school reopenings:  Robustness checks: (a) 







Appendix Figure A10: Robustness checks: (a) Outcome: cumulative cases exponential growth rate; 

















Appendix Figure A12: Robustness checks: (a) Drop El Paso County; (b) Drop six counties w/ > 1 mil 























Appendix Figure A13: Robustness checks:  
(a) Stacked regression 
 




Appendix Figure A14: Specifications leaving-out each of the 6 largest counties in Texas one at a time 






Appendix Figure A15 -- Effects of school reopening on mobility - Control for county-specific time 






Appendix Figure A16 -- Effects of school reopening on mobility - Control for weather variables (all 






Appendix Figure A17 -- Effects of school reopening on mobility - 4-week event-study window (all 






Appendix Figure A18 -- Effects of school reopening on mobility - Treatment defined when 50% of 






Appendix Figure A19 -- Effects of school reopening on mobility - Treatment defined when 20% of 






Appendix Figure A20 -- Effects of school reopening on mobility - Treatment defined when first 






Appendix Figure A21 -- Effects of school reopening on mobility - Control for Trump vote share 









Appendix Figure A22: Specifications leaving-out each of the 6 largest counties in Texas one at a time 
– mobility outcomes at week +6. 
 
 
 
